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THE SOVEREIGN DEBTOR'S PRISON:
ANALYSIS OF THE ARGENTINE CRISIS
ARBITRATIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS
FOR INVESTMENT TREATY LAW
By Robert M. Ziff*
ABSTRACT
Over the last six years, several arbitration panels have re-
leased opinions in a series of disputes raised by investors against Ar-
gentina. In each case, foreign investors claim that Argentina's use of
price controls and currency devaluation following the 2002 economic
crisis constituted a violation of bilateral investment treaty obligations.
Despite the fact that most claimants make identical allegations, many
of these decisions are highly contradictory. In some cases Argentina is
absolved of liability, while in others Argentina is held liable for hun-
dreds of millions in damages. In aggregate, the claimants seek enough
money to bankrupt the Argentine Republic.
Arbitral decisions that hold Argentina liable misinterpret both
investment treaty law and customary international law. In essence,
BITs are designed to resolve ad hoc disputes in which a state has
taken improper action towards a particular investor. They are not de-
signed to serve as an insurance policy when a macroeconomic crisis -
and the necessary state intervention that follows - adversely affects
foreign investors as a class. Instead, customary international law in-
dicates that the parties should renegotiate in light of current economic
realities.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 30, 2010, three arbitral opinions were released in an
ongoing controversy between Argentina and numerous foreign inves-
tors who lost billions of dollars amidst the Argentine financial crisis in
2002. These awards - issued by ad hoc tribunals analyzing a nearly
identical set of facts - are contradictory. Ad hoc tribunals found Ar-
gentina liable in two instances.' But in the third instance, Argentina
' Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A.
v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/19
(July 30, 2010), and AWG Group v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability (July
30, 2010) (UNCITRAL Arbitration) [hereinafter Vivendi/AWG Group Decision on
Liability], aailable at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SuezVivendiAWGDecisio-
nonLiability.pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Inter-
Agua Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
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was relieved of liability.2 This would be surprising but for the fact that
fourteen opinions have been written on the subject and many of them
are contradictory.
Investors have asserted claims under bilateral investment
treaties ("BITs") that Argentina negotiated with capital exporting
states (the U.S., the U.K., Spain, Italy, et cetera) in order to encourage
foreign direct investment ("FDI"). The treaties form part of a larger
infrastructure of BITs - over 2000 treaties between 170 states' - that
protect foreign investment from inappropriate government action. No
two BITs are identical, but most grant the same basic guarantees to
foreign investors. Typically, each state guarantees that it will (a)
grant national and most favored nation ("MFN") treatment for invest-
ments,4 (b) pay compensation for expropriation,' (c) abstain from arbi-
trary or discriminatory measures,6 and (d) show fair and equitable
treatment.' Should the state violate any of these guarantees, the in-
vestor can initiate an international arbitration claim against the state.
Claims are administered by either the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") or an alternate commer-
cial arbitration body under the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules.' Appellate
rights are limited, though the ICSID system does provide for a second
ad hoc annulment committee to review for manifest excess of powers.9
Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter InterAgua
Decision on Liability], available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Suezlnter
AguaDecisiononLiability.pdf.
2 Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision of the ad hoc
Committee on the Application for Annulment, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/
3 (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Enron Annulment Decision], available at http:l
ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf.
3 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties 1959-1999, at iii, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000) available at http://www.unctad.
org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=907&intltemlD=3138&lang=1&mode=down
loads.
4 See generally RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOHP SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 186 (2008).
5 Id. at 273-74
6 Id. at 173.
7 Id. at 119.
8 See ICSID, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp; UNCI-
TRAL.org, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/2010
Arbitration rules.html.
9 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], art. 52 (Annulment and
enforcement).
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Though the system is technically bilateral, it is best described as im-
perfectly multilateral.
Theoretically, investment arbitration provides both investors
and states with a reasonable and depoliticized means to resolve indi-
vidual disputes. Accordingly, it operates similar to traditional inter-
national commercial arbitration. But, for Argentina, something
unexpected has occurred. Amidst a massive economic crisis in which
the state defaulted on US $100 billion in debt and enacted emergency
reforms to its monetary policy,10 foreign investors lost immense sums
of money. Investors - who had invested billions of dollars in Argentine
bonds and privatized industry - felt that Argentina violated its treaty
obligations. In response, these investors initiated the largest number
of BIT claims ever raised against a single state." Argentina main-
tained that liability must be excused by the state of economic emer-
gency. Tribunals are deeply split on the matter, frequently seesawing
back and forth as to whether or not Argentina is liable.
As a rapidly evolving specialty of international law, new arbi-
tral awards significantly influence the development of law.12 Further-
more, the circumstances under which Argentina finds itself are not
unique. While Argentina has a famous history of economic crises, all
states are subject to the same economic cycle. When crisis occurs,
state economies are generally marked by tremendous instability,
which compels governments to enact reform. Sovereign default is also
common, especially among developing countries.' Consequently, the
claims against Argentina are relevant to all states that participate in
the BIT system, not just Argentina. Indeed, every state that partici-
pates in the BIT system must know the answer to one question: To the
extent that states guarantee a stable climate for FDI, should they be
held liable for significant legal reforms that are made as a rational,
good-faith, and potentially necessary response to an economic crisis?
If the answer is yes, then arbitration claims against an insolvent state
transform the BIT system into something like an international insol-
vency regime. This is because claimants are likely to demand restitu-
tion in excess of what the state can pay. Some commentators have
10 See generally PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT):
THE WORLD BANK, WALL STREET, THE IMF, AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA
209-35 (2005).
11 UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, at 2, IIA
Monitor No. 1 (2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD Developments in Dispute Settlement].
12 Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1014, 1015-16 (2007).
13 See generally CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIF-
FEREN T 33 (2009); ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKET EcoNo-
MIES (Martin Feldstein, ed. 2003); PADMA DESAI, FINANCIAL CRISIS, CONTAGION,
AND CONTAINMENT: FROM AsIA To ARGENTINA (2003).
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raised red flags, suggesting that this line of jurisprudence could lead to
a wave of claims against many states at a time when they are least
capable of managing added liability." While such theories remain un-
proven, the legal analysis is sound. If this disturbing line of jurispru-
dence is followed to its logical end, states may be condemned to what
this article calls "the sovereign debtor's prison" - an inefficient process
of ad hoc arbitrations that subjects sovereign states to immense liabil-
ity without limitation at a time when they are in greatest need of debt
relief.
This article analyzes how (a) the sovereign debtor's prison has
developed through incremental jurisprudence; (b) that jurisprudence
conflicts with basic aspects of the economic cycle; and (c) tribunals can
reach a more just resolution to these claims. Part I describes the con-
text of these disputes by summarizing the Argentine crisis of 2002 and
the opinions released to date. Part II describes how financial crises
are pro-cyclical and create long-term negative consequences. Part III
explains how the sovereign debtor's prison is built upon a disconnect
between unlimited BIT liability and the pressing need for states to
regulate amidst a crisis. Part IV describes the implications of this ju-
risprudence and recommends that investment tribunals should con-
sider the greater implications of their awards in order to reach a more
just solution. The article concludes that the failure to consider these
greater implications will undermine the existing BIT structure by
frustrating the intention of the states that ratify these treaties.
PART I. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGENTINE FINANCIAL CRISIS
ARBITRATIONS
1.1 - Argentine Economic History: A Case Study in Crisis
At the dawn of the twentieth century, Argentina was one of the
ten richest nations in the world." Fueled by strong agricultural ex-
ports, growth averaged six to seven percent per annum."6 But over the
next sixty years, a series of "economic and political convulsions"
crushed the nation's early prosperity." This period was marked by
high protective tariffs, a closed state-controlled economy that en-
couraged corruption, fiscal irresponsibility, high inflation, and political
instability. 8 To arrest the startling rate of inflation, the government
14 Anne Van Aaken & Jurgen Kurtz, The Global Financial Crisis: Will State
Emergency Measures Trigger International Investment Disputes?, COLUMBIA FDI
PERSPECTIVEs No. 3 (2009).
15 BLUSTEIN, supra note 10, at 16.
16 Id. at 16.
17 Id. at 17.
18 Id. at 17-18.
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initiated no less than seven stabilization programs based upon on a
fixed exchange rate with promises of fiscal austerity. All of these pro-
grams failed and resulted in currency devaluation." By the late
1980s, Argentina was in the grips of long-term hyperinflation peaking
at a rate of 3,079.5% per annum in 1989.20 One arbitral tribunal has
correctly noted that Argentina's economy was more likely to be in cri-
sis than out.2 1
In this cycle of crisis and rebirth, the government established
"Convertibility" and engaged in a herculean effort to encourage FDI
through a mixture of guarantees and privatization of state-run indus-
tries.2 2 Under the policy of Convertibility, Argentina "established a
hard nominal peg" between the peso and the U.S. dollar at a rate of
1:1.23 State-run industries - e.g. oil, electricity, and telecommunica-
tions - were privatized.24 FDI was considered an essential aspect of
the privatization system, so the government made a series of guaran-
tees to potential foreign investors. Some promises, like Convertibility,
were general in nature. Other policies were more specific. With re-
spect to the gas industry, for example, the government effectively
guaranteed investors a stable stream of tariffs denominated in U.S.
dollars and adjusted according to U.S. Inflation indices. 25 Simultane-
ously, the government negotiated BITs with capital exporting states.2 6
Throughout the 1990s, the Argentine government upheld its guaran-
tees and the economy grew at an impressive rate. Inflation reduced to
19 Nada Choueiri & Graciela Kaminsky, Has the Nature of the Crisis Changed? A
Quarter Century of Currency Crises in Argentina, at 6 (IMF, Working Paper No.
99.152, 1999).
20 See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 13, at 186.
21 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/02/1 (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev.-F.I.L.J. 203 (2006), 228
[hereinafter LG&E Decision on Liability] ("Indeed, the country has issued a record
number of decrees since 1901, accounting for the fact that the emergency periods
in Argentina have been longer than the non-emergency periods."), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&docld=DC625 En&caseld=C208.
22 See IMF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE, THE IMF AND ARGENTINA, 1991-
2001, at 11 (2004) [hereinafter IMF INDEIPEINDENT EVALUATION REPORT].
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/0/.3, [T 41-46 (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award], available at http://
ita. law. uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf.
26 See, e.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Re-
public Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 (1993) [hereinafter US-Ar-
gentina BIT], available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/
argentina us.pdf.
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nominal levels. The budget deficit dropped to less than one percent of
GDP. Argentina received over $100 billion in net capital inflows and
over $60 billion in gross FDI. It became the poster child of the
"Washington Consensus" - a list of economic principles promoted by
the IMF and World Bank that emphasized privatization of industry,
deregulation of the economy, and protection of private property. 8
However, shortly thereafter, a combination of external shocks and in-
ternal structural deficiencies created a vicious economic cycle. Devalu-
ation of the Brazilian real, a strengthening U.S. dollar (which dragged
the peso up with it), a sharp reduction in capital flows to emerging
markets globally, a rise in international interest rates, and a drop in
commodities prices combined with widespread tax evasion, an inflexi-
ble labor market, and an inflexible government budgeting process col-
lectively and rapidly destroyed the Argentine economy. 2 9 Growth
decelerated rapidly, negatively impacting already stressed govern-
ment finances. The government's strict monetary policy, Convertibil-
ity, prevented it from devaluing its currency while enabling capital
flight. The poverty level doubled to 54.3% of the urban population.
Violent demonstrations, riots, and looting erupted. A political vacuum
formed in which a series of presidents resigned in a matter of days.ao
Ultimately, the government was forced to abandon Convertibility and
defaulted on over US $100 billion in debt as it faced the prospect of
total insolvency. Once the peso began to float on the open market, it
rapidly fell to less than US $0.25 per peso. To prevent significant ad-
ded hardship, the government converted all dollar-denominated debt
and utility tariffs within the country into pesos at the rate of 1:1 - so-
called "pesofication" of the economy.3 1 Companies who believed their
revenue was guaranteed in U.S. dollars suddenly found their revenue
reduced dramatically.3 2 These companies, which had financed their
investments in dollars on the international markets, soon defaulted on
their loans.3 The government's decision to adopt "pesofication" and
default on its debt - despite numerous prior guarantees to the contrary
27 See IMF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 11.
28 See BLUSTEIN, supra note 10, at 4.
29 See IMF INDEPENDENT EVALUALTION REPORT, supra note 22, at 64. See also
BLUSTEIN, supra note 10, at 59-60, 196-201; Timothy GEITHNER, IMF POLICY
DEVEL. & REVIEw DEP'T, LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA, at 38 (2003),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/lessons/100803.htm.
30 See IMF INDEPENDENT EVALUALTION REPORT, supra note 22, at 11-16.
31 See id. at 13.
32 See, e.g., National Grid P.L.C. v. Argentine Republic (Nov. 3, 2008) (UNCITRAL
Arbitration) [hereinafter National Grid Award], available at http://ita.law.uvic.cal
documents/NGvArgentina.pdf.
33 See, e.g., id., at 1 64.
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- are now the subject of the largest number of BIT claims raised
against any government to date.
1.2 - The Published Opinions
The claimants have universally asserted (1) expropriation of
investment, (2) violation of the umbrella clause, and (3) violation of the
fair and equitable treatment standard. All of the BIT claims relateto
Argentina's default and its abandonment of Convertibility. In its re-
sponse, Argentina has raised two affirmative defenses: (a) non-viola-
tion pursuant to the non-precluded measures ("NPM") clause found in
the US-Argentina BIT"' and (b) necessity pursuant to Article 25 of
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts ("Draft Articles")." Nine cases have reached some
stage of conclusion regarding liability. Billions of dollars have already
been awarded to various claimants, though two of the larger claims
were subsequently annulled."
3 See UNCTAD Developments in Dispute Settlement, supra note 11, at 3 ("Over-
all, Argentina still tops the list with 48 claims lodged against it.").
3 See US-Argentina BIT, supra note 26, Art. XI.
36 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
with Commentaries (2001), 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001),
corrected by U.N. Doc. A/56/49 (Vol.I)/Corr.4 [hereinafter Draft Articles], available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9 6 2001.
pdf.
3 The published opinions are: CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic,
Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Gas
Award], available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CMSFinalAward_000.pdf;
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, Decision of the ad hoc Commit-
tee on the Application for Annulment, ICSID (W.Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8 (Sept.
25, 2007) [hereinafter CMS Gas Annulment Decision], available at http://
ita.law. uvic.ca/documents/CMSAnnulmentDecision.pdf, LG&E Decision on Liabil-
ity, supra note 21; Enron Award, supra note 25; Enron Annulment Decision, supra
note 2; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID (W.Bank) Case
No. ARB/02/16 (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Energy Award], available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SempraAward.pdf; Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argen-
tine Republic, Decision on the Argentine Republic's Request for Annulment, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/16 (June 29, 2010) [hereinafter Sempra Energy An-
nulment Decision], available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SempraAnnul-
mentDecision.pdf; BG Group Plc. and Republic of Argentina, Final Award (Dec.
24, 2007) (UNCIRAL Arbitration) [hereinafter BG Group Award], available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/BG-award_000.pdf; Continental Casualty Co. v.
Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/9 (Sept. 5, 2008)
[hereinafter Continental Casualty Award, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docu-
ments/ContinentalCasualtyAward.pd f; National Grid Award, supra note 32; Inter-
agua Decision on Liability, supra note 1; VivendilAWG Group Decision on
Liability, supra note 1.
THE SOVEREIGN DEBTOR'S PRISON
The Appendix summarizes the outcome of the decided claims to
date." Chart 1 organizes the claims into three groups based upon two
separate criteria - similarity of BIT provisions and similarity of
claims. Claimants listed under Groups 1 and 2 are all similarly regu-
lated utility companies (gas transportation/distribution, electrical
power, or municipal water supply) whose factual allegations are nearly
identical. Group 1 claimants are U.S. nationals. These nationals fall
under the US-Argentina BIT, which contains a Non-Precluded Mea-
sures Clause ("NPM")." Group 2 claimants are western European na-
tionals and fall under BITs signed with the UK, France, and Spain.
Since none of these treaties contain an NPM clause, Argentina can
only argue customary necessity under the Draft Articles as a defense.
(As will be shown later, relying upon the customary standard alone is
more difficult).4 0 Group 3 is composed of a single case, Continental
Casualty. This case must be distinguished from Groups 1 and 2 be-
cause it relies solely upon the Convertibility regime as a source of
rights while the other claims rely upon express guarantees that Argen-
tina made to privatized utility companies. Chart 2 lists the relevant
publicly available opinions in chronological order.
A cursory review of these decisions reveals two significant fac-
tors. Chart 1 reveals the near-universal agreement that Argentina vi-
olated the fair and equitable treatment standard. Argentina's
emergency reform measures - which devalued the currency, froze pub-
lic utility tariffs, and otherwise radically altered the business environ-
ment - altered the legal environment that foreign investors had relied
upon. Furthermore, several tribunals found that Argentina also vio-
lated its obligations under the umbrella clause by violating express
guarantees made to certain investors. Consequently, almost all tribu-
nals agree Argentina violated basic obligations of investment treaty
law.
There is, however, no consensus with regard to the necessity
defense. Altogether, twelve three-member panels have considered the
issue; seven tribunals rejected the necessity defense, two tribunals ac-
cepted the defense, and three ICSID annulment committees indicated
support for Argentina's defense. Given the small sample size and the
fact that several arbitrators sit on multiple tribunals,"' a simple com-
parison of yeas and nays reveals nothing. A chronological analysis is
38 See infra Appendix.
3 US-Argentina BIT, supra note 26, at Art. XI.
40 See infra Part 3.4.1.
41 The same arbitrator presided as president of the CMS Gas, Enron, and Sempra
Energy tribunals and the final opinions are remarkably similar. Additionally, the
Vivendi IAWG Group and InterAgua decisions were decided by identical tribunals.
Thus, what appears to be five unique opinions is actually just two.
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also of little value. Chart 2 reveals that decisions are regularly re-
leased going both ways on the issue; thus, there is no movement to-
ward a specific position.
1.3 - The Fundamental Question: Are States Liable for Necessary
Reforms?
While Argentina's economic policy was less than ideal, the his-
torical record shows that the principal public officials acted in good
faith.42 Before the crisis peaked, Argentina attempted to maintain
Convertibility while paying off its sovereign debt by engaging in an
intense austerity plan that severely affected its own population. When
the austerity measures failed to prevent massive capital flight, the
government had no choice but to break Convertibility and legislative
forced pesification of the economy in order to prevent total insolvency.
In other words, Argentina experienced a balance of payments crisis,
which often occurs when states establish a fixed foreign exchange
rate.4 3
Financial crises arise in many forms, of which a balance of pay-
ments crisis is one. As Reinhart and Rogoffs recent work, This Time is
Different, makes abundantly clear, "[F]inancial crises follow a rhythm
of boom and bust through the ages. Countries, institutions, and finan-
cial instruments may change across time, but human nature does
not."4" Accordingly, a single question of law permeates all of the
claims against Argentina: To the extent that states guarantee a stable
climate for foreign direct investment, should they be held liable for sig-
nificant legal reforms that are made as a rational, good-faith, and po-
tentially necessary response to an economic crisis?
If the answer is yes i.e., if BIT arbitration is utilized to assign
liability in the midst of a financial crisis, the results may be stagger-
ing. The pending claims against Argentina are valued at multiple bil-
lions of dollars, well beyond what Argentina could pay.4 5 Thus, the
42 See Sempra Energy Award, supra note 37, at 11 304.
4 PAUL KRJGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMics: THEORY AND
POLIcY, 460-461 (7th ed. 2006) ("In many practical situations . the central bank
may find it undesirable or infeasible to maintain the current fixed exchange rate.
The central bank may be running short on foreign reserves, for example, as hap-
pened to many developing countries in the 1990s and 2000s, or it may face high
domestic unemployment. Because market participants know the central bank
may respond to such situations by devaluing the currency, it would be unreasona-
ble for them to expect the current exchange rate to be maintained forever.").
44 REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 13, at xxviii.
4 See, e.g.,Giovanna A. Beccara, et al. v. Argentine Republic, Confidentiality Or-
der, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, 2-4, 5 September 2008 [hereinafter Beccara Or-
der], available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/BeccaraConfidentialityOrder
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system transforms into an international sovereign bankruptcy code
devoid of efficient procedures or guidelines for handling it.
PART II. ECONOMIC PRACTICALITIES: THE CYCLE OF
MANIA AND CRISIS
The developing jurisprudence related to the Argentine crisis
could be dismissed as sui generis if the circumstances that led to the
crisis were abnormal. However, the Argentine crisis was the latest in
a wave of crises that began in East Asia and spread to Russia, Mexico,
Turkey and Brazil before affecting the Argentine economy.46 Further-
more, it is part of a much larger cycle of crises recurring throughout
history. Reinhart and Rogoff have analyzed hundreds of episodes in
which sovereign states have defaulted on their external debt.4 7 Ac-
cording to their analysis, "there are long periods when a high percent-
age of all countries are in a state of default . . ."48 The ability to
accurately predict or prevent such crises remains elusive. However,
certain conclusions are sufficiently accepted by mainstream econo-
mists as to be useful for policy makers: (1) economic crises are simulta-
neously pro-cyclical and unpredictable; (2) crises create instability,
which compels the government to intervene; (3) crises cause negative
and/or low economic growth, which persists long after the "crisis" has
passed; and (4) developing countries are particularly prone to crisis.
(1) Crises are pro-cyclical and unpredictable. Economic crises come in
many forms: inter alia hyperinflation, currency crashes, bursting asset
price bubbles, banking crises, external debt crises, and domestic debt
crises. But before a crisis develops, the market is often in the grips of
euphoria. A widely held belief that fundamental rules no longer apply
permeates the market. Reinhart and Rogoff call it the "This Time is
Different Syndrome." This syndrome "is rooted in the firmly held be-
lief that financial crises are things that happen to other people in other
countries at other times; crises do not happen to us, here and now.""
Kindelberger, in his seminal work Manias, Panics & Crashes, de-
scribes a similar phenomenon that he calls "mania":
The features of these manias are never identical and yet
there is a similar pattern. The increase in prices of com-
modities or real estate or stocks is associated with eu-
001.pdf; see also Aby Cohen Smutny, Attorney profile, White & Case available at
http://www.whitecase.com/asmutny/.
46 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES: AN OVER-
VIEW OF PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT, 1 (Martin Feldstein ed. 2003).
47 REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 13, at 51.
48 Id. at 68.
49 Id. at 15.
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phoria; household wealth increases and so does
spending. There is a sense of 'We never had it so good.'so
Amidst euphoria, market participants are blinded by their own
false expectations; they cannot see their place in an asset bubble.
With regard to the Argentine crisis, Blustein describes how "a fevered
atmosphere for emerging markets had taken hold in the financial
world, based on the belief that the fastest growth, quickest profits, and
highest yields were to be found in former economic backwaters that
were getting with the capitalist program."" Eventually, however, sell-
ers outnumber buyers. Prices fall rapidly and panic ensues.5 2
The cycle becomes apparent only when viewed in hindsight.
Reinhart & Rogoffs data reveal a recurrent pattern in which "serial
default remains the norm" across the world and throughout history."a
Kindelberger relates the tales of countless crises.54
(2) Instability compels the state to act. The cycle-one of manias fol-
lowed by panics-creates "pro-cyclical changes in the supply of credit;
the credit supply increases relatively rapidly in good times, and then
when economic growth slackens, the rate of growth of credit has often
declined sharply."" The lack of credit creates hardship and the risk
"that a deflationary panic [will] spread and wipe out sound investment
by the non-speculators."s" Though some economists argue against
state intervention,
[T]he dominant argument against the a priori view that panics
can be cured by being left alone is that they almost never are left alone
... [i]n panic after panic, crash after crash, crisis after crisis, the au-
thorities . . . try to halt the panic by one device or another."
(3) Economic crises entail long-term consequences to the economy as a
whole. The countries that experienced crisis in the 1990s eventually
rebounded, although the crisis continued to affect them for years after-
wards. Growth rates, lending, and stock market indices remained be-
low pre-crisis levels for years." Reinhart and Rogoffs data confirm
this phenomenon as characteristic of all crises. Output always falls
dramatically while unemployment and government debt increases.'
50 CHARLES P. KINDELBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIA, PANICS, AND CRASHEs: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 11 (5th ed. 2005).
51 BLUSTEIN, supra note 10, at 30.
52 Id. at 3.
5:3 See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 13, at Figs. 5.1-5.2.
5 See generally KINDELBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 50.
5s Id. at 10.
56 Id. at 178.
5 Id. at 181.
5 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note
46, at 16-17.
59 REINHART & RoGOFF, supra note 13, at 226-238.
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"Fiscal finances suffer mightily as government revenues shrink in the
aftermath of crises and bailout costs mount."') If sovereign default
occurs, it persists for an average of three years."' Returning to pre-
crisis levels of output takes an average of four years."
(4) Developing countries are particularly prone to crisis. Developing
countries are more likely to suffer financial crisis and sovereign de-
fault. In particular, many developing countries are "serial defaulters"
of sovereign debt.'" A variety of explanations exist for this phenome-
non, suggesting that multiple structural weaknesses are involved. For
instance, developing countries generally lack a robust and modernized
financial system, which creates instability when they liberalize their
economies to attract investment." In addition, fixed exchange rates
and insufficient foreign currency reserves make developing countries
more sensitive to crisis.6 ' Furthermore, they are particularly depen-
dent upon financing from developed countries; therefore, a crisis in the
economic "north" can spread rapidly to developing countries. 6 Moreo-
ver, international markets lack confidence in developing countries'
ability to pay debt, creating debt intolerance - "the extreme duress
many emerging markets experience at external debt levels that would
seem quite manageable by the standards of advanced countries."6
Undoubtedly, there are other potential reasons.
A thorough analysis of economic crises is beyond the scope of
this article. However, in the realm of investment treaty law, arbitra-
tors need to be aware of the economic cycle because it has profound
implications for the field. In particular, the fact that economic crises
are unpredictable, pro-cyclical, and destabilizing should give any arbi-
trator pause before laying an extra several billion in debt on already
struggling populations.
60 Id. at 289.
61 Id. at 80.
62 Id. at 236.
63 Id. at 89-100.
64 See Jason Furman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights
from East Asia, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIv., No. 2, at 32 (1998); see also
Christian E. Weller, Financial Crises After Financial Liberalization (Center for
Eur. Integration Studies, Working Paper No. B99-15, 1999).
65 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note
46, at 4, 10.
66 REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 13, at 74.
67 Id. at 21; Luis Catdo & Sandeep Kapur, Volatility and the Debt-Intolerance Par-
adox, at 195 -96 (IMF, Staff Paper, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2006).
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PART III. UNLIMITED PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY:
THE SOVEREIGN DEBTOR'S PRISON
In light of the recurrent and long-term negative consequences
of economic crises described in Part II, sovereign debtors may need an
organized and efficient structure that permits them to default and re-
solve their international debts efficiently. . The IMF has suggested
such a system in the past, prompting some academics to consider a
possible structure." With regard to sovereign bonds, many now in-
clude Collective Action Clauses ("CAC"s) that enable negotiations be-
tween the state and all bondholders simultaneously after default
occurs. The BIT system, however, is not designed to accomplish an
efficient distribution of assets. The guarantees contained in these
treaties protect individual private property claims without regard to
the interests of other claimants."
Given the infancy of investment treaty law, many questions re-
main unanswered. How far does the protection of property extend?
For instance, should liability extend to claims against insolvent states?
It seems no authoritative source contemplated this question before the
BIT system expanded in the latter half of the twentieth century. Due
to conflicting jurisprudence, the question has no definitive answer.
However, BIT standards are designed to operate as a counterweight
against populist anger (more common in democracies) and arbitrary
decision-making (more common in authoritarian regimes) that often
precipitate in times of stress. This is certainly true with respect to
three standards that implicate the state's regulatory authority - the
fair and equitable treatment standard, the umbrella clause, and the
(indirect) expropriation clause. On this foundation, the sovereign
debtor's prison is built. .
3.1 - Fair and Equitable Treatment: Respecting the Investor's
Expectations to the Exclusion of Other Values
There is "no general agreement on the precise meaning" of the
fair and equitable treatment standard."o BITs rarely define it and
"[tihe 'ordinary meaning' of the 'fair and equitable treatment' standard
68 See, e.g., Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How
Should a Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured, 53 EMORY L. J. 763
(2004).
69 See Nicolas Marcelo Perrone, Scrutinizing State's Power in a Liberalized Econ-
omy: A Comparative Analysis of the International Investment Regime and the In-
ternational Trade System 10-13 (Society of Int'l Econ. Law, Working Paper No.
2010/25, 2010).
70 ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNOMIC CO-OPEArION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD], INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A CHANGING LANDSCAPE, 104 (2005).
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can only be defined by terms of almost equal vagueness."" Neverthe-
less, the fair and equitable treatment standard remains an integral
guarantee of all investment treaties. It is always invoked by com-
plaining investors and remains the most likely claim to succeed on the
merits."
3.1.1 - Fair and Equitable Treatment Defined
The dominant position in investment treaty law holds that
"fair and equitable treatment" is a broadly applicable and objective
standard of behavior. States must comply with certain standards of
behavior including (a) transparency, (b) consistency, (c) compliance
with contractual obligations, (d) procedural and proprietary due pro-
cess, (e) good faith, (f) absence of coercion or harassment, and (g) sta-
bility of the legal and business framework and protection of the
investor's reasonable expectations." That the standard has come to
mean so much (a broad duty to respect investor expectations and re-
frain from altering key provisions of the law) from so little (the words
"fair and equitable") is due to three factors. First, the fair and equita-
ble treatment clause is a gap-filling measure designed to censure all
"inappropriate" behavior." Second, the vague language employed
"easily lends itself to an expansive view of its reach extending to all
corners and aspects of an investment setting."" Third, and perhaps
most important, an ever-increasing body of arbitral opinions continues
to broaden the standard.
Although each investment tribunal is formally ad hoc and
therefore without precedential value, in practice, tribunals recognize
an "informal, but powerful system of precedent. . ."" Ten years after
the Metalclad" award first defined fair and equitable treatment, the
71 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 297 (March 17,
2006) (UNCITRAL Arbitration); see Enron Award, supra note 25, at 1 256 ("[Flair
and equitable treatment is a standard none too clear and precise."); LG&E Deci-
sion on Liability, supra note 12, at 122 (noting the standard is not defined by the
treaty).
72 UNCTAD Developments in Dispute Settlement, supra note 11, at 8.
73 See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT LAw 133-52 (2008).
74 Id. at 122.
7 Rudolph Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment
Treaties, 39 INT'L LAw. 87, 91 (2005).
76 See Cheng, supra note 12, at 1016.
77 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, 5 ICSID Rep. 209 (Aug. 30, 2000).
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concept has begun to solidify." In doing so, tribunals have created an
increasingly large body of jurisprudence that defines the fair and equi-
table treatment standard in a manner that emphasizes protection of
the investor with little regard to the regulatory responsibility of the
state.
Consider, for example, the state's obligation to maintain a sta-
ble legal environment and protect the investor's reasonable expecta-
tions. Under this obligation, a state's liability is judged by a three
factor test: (1) the investor must form a legitimate expectation based
upon the state's laws or via direct dealings with the state; (2) the in-
vestor must rely upon such expectations in making its investment; and
(3) a sudden change in the laws or treatment by the government must
frustrate the investor's expectations." In Argentina's case, the state
made various promises to the foreign investment community regard-
ing the legal environment, sometimes including guaranteed increases
in revenue."o In reliance upon these promises, the investors borrowed
heavily from international markets in order to invest in Argentina.
But when the financial crisis reached its apex, Argentina eradicated
Convertibility and violated important guarantees. The investors, who
suddenly received devalued pesos while attempting to maintain debt
that remained valued in US dollars, defaulted on their loans. As such,
the investors formed "reasonable" expectations based upon the state's
guarantees of increased revenue, relied upon those guarantees to fi-
nance their investments, and suffered immense losses when the state
violated those guarantees. Consequently, almost every tribunal has
determined that Argentina violated the fair and equitable treatment
standard.81
The Enron Award summarizes the matter in a characteristic fashion:
267 . . . It is clear that the stable legal framework that
induced the investment is no longer in place and that a
definitive framework has not been made available for al-
most five years.
268. Even assuming that the Respondent was guided by
the best of intentions, which the tribunal has no reason
to doubt, there is here an objective breach of the fair and
equitable treatment due under the treaty ... 82
7 Id. See, e.g., LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 21, 125 ("[T]he tribunal
considers this interpretation to be an emerging standard of fair and equitable
treatment in international law.").
7 See InterAgua Decision on Liability, supra note 1, T 202-207.
so Id.
81 The issue is complicated by the Continental Casualty Award, whose reasoning
is unclear. See Continental Casualty Award, supra note 37, TT 254-266.
82 Enron Award, supra note 25, TT 267-268.
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3.1.2 - Critique of Fair and Equitable Treatment as Applied to
Economic Crises
According to this logic, "fair and equitable treatment" is synon-
ymous with pacta sunt servanda. Why this should be the case is not
intuitively obvious. Assuming the words "fair and equitable treat-
ment" requires states to maintain a stable legal framework under peri-
ods of normal growth or even recession, the same deductive reasoning
does not apply under extreme economic stress. Kingsbury and Schill
make the point succinctly:
[T]he investor's expectations about the State's future
conduct in ordinary circumstances can not necessarily be
transposed into a 'legitimate expectation' about State ac-
tion in extraordinary circumstances, and expectations
ought in many cases to encompass the possibility that
the State may take some regulatory actions. States are
regulators with public responsibilities."
Investors are certainly aware that an economic crisis can im-
pact expected revenue. All investment involves risk, for which inves-
tors happily charge a premium. In some countries, the risks related to
investment may be particularly high. Indeed, a small industry of
respected analysts exist to determine the precise level of country-spe-
cific risk - which includes the risks of default, devaluation, inflation,
and other factors that impact investor's expectations.84 Investors use
these reports in order to determine the appropriate return on invest-
ment relative to the increased risk. Investors never rely solely on the
state's guarantees; to do so would be irrational.
83 Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as Govern-
ance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global Ad-
ministrative Law, 12 (NYU School of Law: Public Law and Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-46, 2009).
84 See, e.g., ECONOMIST, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, available at http://www.
eiu.com/public; EUROMONEY, COUNTRY RISK RATINGS, available at http://www.
euromoney.com/poll/10683/PollsAndAwards/Country-Risk.html; STANDARD AND
PooR's, SovEREIGN: RATINGS AND RESOURCES, available at http://www.standar-
dandpoors.com/ratings/govs-sovereigns/en/us; MOODYS, available at http://v3.
moodys.com/Pages/default.aspx; see also LLEYELLYN D. HOWELL, THE HANDBOOK
OF COUNTRY AND POLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS, 45 (4th ed. 2007) (Country risks are
"economic and financial characteristics of a system, along with the political and
social, . in which foreign investors will find problems in specific national envi-
ronments.") (emphasis removed).
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The Enron Award paid lip service to the notion that the claim-
ant's expectations must be "reasonable and justifiable."" However,
the tribunal's analysis is limited to determining whether the state
made guarantees. It does not consider the reasonableness of the guar-
antees themselves. Herein lies the problem. In order for claimants to
rely upon the fair and equitable treatment standard, they must estab-
lish that they had a reasonable expectation that Convertibility could
be maintained. At the very least, they must establish that the risk of
devaluation shifted from the investors to the state. Although it can be
argued that Argentina made such guarantees, no reasonable investor
could possibly have believed that Argentina would follow through in
the event of a crisis. In fact, reasonable investors did not actually be-
lieve that these risks were eliminated. They calculated the added risk
and demanded a commensurate higher return instead.8 If they had
believed their investments were truly safe, then the rate of return on
investment would have been much closer to the rate charged for simi-
lar investments in the United States where the risk of default is low.
Furthermore, it is unclear why investors had any reason to ex-
pect that Argentina could shoulder the cumulative weight of its guar-
antees. Before the crisis, "Argentina received more than $100 billion
in net capital inflows, including over $60 billion in gross foreign direct
investments."8 7 Investors were undoubtedly aware of the piles of
money flooding into the country. By way of comparison, Argentina's
total foreign currency reserves in June 2010 were just US $50 bil-
lion." Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that Argentina could
possibly make good on such promises to investors after such a massive
speculative bust.
Nevertheless, all but one tribunal takes the opposite approach.
According to the National Grid Award, it is precisely because of Argen-
tina's prior crises that Argentina felt obliged to make such guarantees
to investors: "[t]he Claimant made its investment at a time when, after
a severe economic crisis, the Respondent was trying to offer a different
85 Enron Award, supra note 25, at T 262; see also Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp.
v. United Mexican States, Award, T 147-48, Jan. 26, 2006 (UNCITRAL Arbitra-
tion), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn-award.pdf,
86 See CMS Gas Award, supra note 37, at T 184-85.
87 IMF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 11.
88 See IMF, ARGENTINA: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES / FOREIGN CURRENCY LIQUIDITY,
http://www.imf.org/external/np/stalir/IRProcessWeb/data/arg/eng/curarg.htm.
Even if Argentina desired to pay off all investors with their foreign currency
reserves currency reserves, such a move would likely prove highly destabilizing.
Foreign currency reserves are essential to preventing currency crises. See Frede-
ric S. Mishkin, Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in Emerg-
ing market Countries, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING MARKET
ECONOMIES 126-127 (Martin Feldstein, ed., 2003).
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image to investors."" Similarly, the InterAgua Decision on Liability
noted, "lilt was largely because of the country's history of instability
that the Claimants required the incorporation of the specific clauses
on extraordinary tariff adjustment reviews mentioned above.")o Con-
sequently, the tribunal emphasized Argentina's promise while ignor-
ing its clear inability to perform in the event of a crisis. It furthermore
ignores the fact that investors never fully accepted the state's guaran-
tees in the first place.
3.1.3 - Minority Voices
The strict interpretation of fair and equitable treatment is not
universally accepted. Even amongst arbitrators, some voices of dis-
sent exist. For instance, Duke Energy v. Ecuador suggested that an
investor's "reasonable expectations" depends upon all relevant
circumstances:
To be protected, the investor's expectations must be le-
gitimate and reasonable at the time when the investor
makes the investment. The assessment of the reasona-
bleness or legitimacy must take into account all circum-
stances, including not only the facts surrounding the
investment, but also the political, socioeconomic, cultural
and historical conditions prevailing in the host State."
The Continental Casualty Award similarly criticized the domi-
nant pro-investor interpretation of "fair and equitable treatment."
The award states, in dictum, that, "it would be unconscionable for a
country to promise not to change its legislation as time and needs
change, or even more to tie its hands by such a kind of stipulation in
case a crisis of any type or origin arose."92
Most recently, Pedro Nikken - a former President of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and one of Argentina's appointed
arbitrators - wrote a scathing separate opinion in the InterAgua and
Vivendi /AWG decisions that was highly critical of the tribunal's strict
interpretation of "fair and equitable treatment." According to Nikken,
"[i]t is unreasonable to assume that the States would have been will-
ing to commit themselves beyond what the canons of good governance
would require."" Nevertheless, this is the minority perspective.
89 National Grid Award, supra note 32, at 176.
90 InterAgua Decision on Liability, supra note 1, at 1 214.
91 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador,
Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No ARB/04/19, 340 (emphasis added).
92 Continental Casualty Award, supra note 37, at 1 258.
93 Vivendi/AWG Group, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, at 20,
available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SuezVivendiAWGSeparateOpinion.
pdf (emphasis in original).
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3.2 - Other BIT Guarantees Similarly Restrict The State's Regulatory
Power.
Other BIT guarantees similarly compel states to freeze policy
or face liability. Two standards in particular - the umbrella clause
and the (indirect) expropriation clause - raise specific concerns.
A typical umbrella clause requires states to "observe any obli-
gation it may have entered into with regard to investments."9" Its
function is to transform contract claims into treaty claims. The clause
is simplistically short, but applying it consistently has proven diffi-
cult." Both tribunals and academics are unclear as to its meaning,
inevitably leading to contradictory opinions.9
This difficulty is evident in the claims against Argentina. Six
opinions have considered whether Argentina violated the umbrella
clause in light of the guarantees that it made to investors .Under iden-
tical facts and law, four tribunals found that Argentina violated um-
brella clause guarantees. However, one tribunal reached the opposite
conclusion; and one annulment committee determined that the tribu-
nal's finding of liability constituted annullable error."
Despite this inconsistency of opinion, some basic conclusions
can be drawn. First, the umbrella clause blurs the distinction between
contractual obligations and treaty obligations." Second, a liberal in-
terpretation of the clause holds that any contractual commitment cre-
ates an obligation under the treaty.9 9 Where such obligations exist,
liability can attach automatically. Unlike "fair and equitable treat-
ment", the umbrella clause is not limited by any kind of reasonable-
ness analysis.
BIT protection against expropriation is more straightforward.
Standard BITs provide that an investment may not be expropriated
unless compensation equal to the fair market value is provided in re-
turn. 00 The issue becomes complicated, however, where the claimant
94 US-Argentina BIT, supra note 26, at Art. 1I(2)(c).
9 See Sempra Energy Award, supra note 37, at T 309 (describing the umbrella
clause as a "mystery").
96 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 4, at 155 ("[T]he purpose, meaning, and
scope of the clause have caused controversy and have given rise to disturbingly
divergent lines of jurisprudence.").
97 See Appendix, Chart 1.
9 See DolZER & SCHREITER, supra note 4, at 155; CMS Gas Award, supra note, at
T 296-303 (finding a violation of the umbrella clause due to a failure to respect
stabilization clauses); but see CMS Gas Annulment Decision, supra note 37, at
89-100 (annulling the tribunal's conclusion on this point).
99 See Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, 18-21
(OECD, Working Papers on Int'l Investment No. 2006/3, 2006).
1oo See, e.g., US-Argentina BIT, supra note 26, at Art. IV(1).
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alleges "creeping", "regulatory", and/or "indirect" expropriation. Gen-
erally speaking, such expropriation occurs where "interference with
the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in
whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious ben-
efit of the host State."" Such interference generally involves a regu-
latory act of the state.
The difficult question is distinguishing the difference between
a non-compensable regulatory act and a compensable act of expropria-
tion. International law provides little definitive guidance in this mat-
ter.'0 2 Expropriation is relevant here because it is implicated in one
aspect of economic crises - sovereign default. Default is defined by the
state's failure to pay agreed compensation on its debt. Thus, it may be
a regulatory expropriation because it deprives the owner of the invest-
ment's reasonably expected economic benefit.o In the case of Argen-
tina, a conglomeration of over 195,000 Italian claimants with US$4.4
billion in defaulted Argentine government bonds have initiated an in-
vestment claim against Argentina.10 4 If they succeed on the merits,
the award will have profound implications for the government's
finances. 0 5
3.3 - Standard BIT Protections Encourage the State to Abstain from
Legal Reform Even Where the Need for Reform is Extreme.
The "fair and equitable treatment standard" - which threatens
liability whenever the state engages in reform - encourages the state
to freeze economic and regulatory policies. Where the umbrella clause
applies, the state's obligations become absolute. Furthermore, if a tri-
bunal declares that a state is liable for defaulting on its debt (which
seems likely) the obligation to pay compensation on expropriation may
attach without limitation. Therefore, if the cumulative impact of these
guarantees is considered as a whole, then regulatory power is wholly
subject to the investor's private property rights. The Sempra Energy
Award reflects this understanding, albeit in decidedly diplomatic
fashion:
A judicial determination as to compliance with the re-
quirements of international law in this matter should
101 See Metalclad, supra note 77, at 103.
102 See Saluka, supra note 71, at 263-264; see also National Grid Award, supra
note 32, at 148.
103 See Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, Award, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/96/3, 37 I.L.M. 1391 (1998) (regarding failure to pay on promissory notes).
104 See Beccara Order, supra note 45.
105 See generally Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora's Box: Sovereign Bonds in In-
ternational Arbitration, 101 AMER. J. INT'L. L. 711 (2007).
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not be understood as suggesting that arbitral tribunals
wish to substitute their views for the functions of sover-
eign States. Such a ruling instead simply responds to
the Tribunal's duty that, in applying international law, it
cannot fail to give effect to legal commitments that are
binding on the parties .. .10
Consequently, standard BIT guarantees create negative incen-
tives for government reform at a time of crisis. Economic crises entail
significant instability, the impact of which can be extreme. 10 7 In Ar-
gentina, instability threatened to destabilize the state itself. However,
investment treaties encourage the state to avoid reform, especially if
the potential for liability is significant. Thus, in order for a state to act
in times of need, investment treaty law requires a limiting doctrine.
3.4 - The Necessity Defense
The necessity doctrine actually involves two separate but over-
lapping defenses. The first derives from the Non-Precluded Measures
("NPM") clause, found in some BITs (including the US-Argentina BIT).
The second defense springs from the customary international law de-
fense of necessity as embodied in Article 25 of the Draft Articles.
3.4.1 - Confusion Between the NPM Clause and Article 25
The NPM clause is a typical feature of BITs signed by certain
major trading nations including the United States, Germany, and In-
dia.1 os Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT contains a relatively typical
formulation of an NPM clause:
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either
Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of pub-
lic order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to
the maintenance or restoration of international peace or
security, or the Protection of its own essential security
interests."10
The NPM clause "allow [s] states to take actions otherwise in-
consistent with the treaty when, for example, the actions are neces-
sary for the protection of essential security, the maintenance of public
106 Sempra Energy Award, supra note 37, at T{ 389.
107 See supra Part II.
108 See William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Ex-
traordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures
Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 318 (2008); see
also, UNCTAD, COUNTRY LISTS OF BITs, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.
asp?intltemlD=2344&lang=1 (last updated June 1, 2009).
109 U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 23, at art. XI.
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order, or to respond to a public health emergency."' (" It is a primary
rule of international law, which is to say that it addresses the question
of compliance with a treaty obligation."' Thus, if a state's actions fall
within the confines of the NPM clause, the state's actions do not con-
stitute a violation of the treaty.' " The NPM clause is a broadly appli-
cable provision designed to shield the state from liability for carrying
out the "particular state objectives" mentioned in the clause.'"
Article 25 of the Draft Articles codifies the other necessity de-
fense based on customary international law:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground
for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in con-
formity with an international obligation of that State
unless the act:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an es-
sential interest against a grave and imminent
peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of
the State or States towards which the obligation
exists, or of the international community as a
whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State
as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) the international obligation in question excludes
the possibility of invoking necessity; or
(b) the State has contributed to the situation of
necessity.114
Unlike an NPM clause, which precludes wrongfulness alto-
gether, Article 25 is concerned with the consequences of wrongfulness.
It should not be considered until after a tribunal has determined that
a primary rule of international law - such as a BIT obligation - has
been violated." 5 Furthermore, Article 25 is a general rule applicable
to all disputes under international law. Thus, a state can claim neces-
sity under Article 25 regardless of whether the treaty includes an ex-
press provision to that effect.116
110 See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 108, at 311-12.
111 See Draft Articles, General Commentary, supra note 33, at 1 1-4.
112 See CMS Gas Annulment Decision, supra note 34, at 1 129 ("Article XI is a
threshold requirement: if it applies, the substantive obligations under the treaty
do not apply.").
113 See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 108, at 321.
114 See Draft Articles, supra note 36, at art. 25.
115 See id., General Commentary, at T 3.
116 See id., Ch. 5, Commentary, at 1 ("The existence in a given case of a circum-
stance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter provides a shield
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Despite clear differences in function and structure, the two pro-
visions have something in common. Both provisions preclude the state
from liability under extreme circumstances. 1 1 7 Perhaps for this rea-
son, tribunals are frequently confused as to the relationship between
the NPM clause and Article 25. Several awards concluded that the
NPM clause and Article 25 are identical.1 1 8 Separately, the LG&E De-
cision on Liability recognized a clear distinction between the NPM
clause and customary necessity. Yet, upon finding Argentina met the
standard of customary necessity, the Tribunal made a curious state-
ment: "[wlhile this analysis concerning Article 25 of the Draft Articles
on State Responsibility alone does not establish Argentina's defense, it
supports the Tribunal's analysis with regard to the meaning of Article
X. .. ."119
This confusion is in stark contrast to the wording of the Draft
Articles, which state that "[c]ircumstances precluding wrongfulness
are to be distinguished from other arguments which may have the ef-
fect of allowing a State to avoid responsibility." 12 0 Perhaps as a result,
all three annulment committee decisions have expressly stated that
Article XI and customary necessity are completely distinct. 12 1
3.4.2 - Implications of Multiple Unique Standards
Determining the limits of the necessity defense under Article
25 of the Draft Articles is critical to understanding the application of
investment treaty guarantees at times of crisis. While the NPM clause
is a standard provision in some state's model BITs, it is hardly ubiqui-
tous. A number of important capital exporting states - European
states in particular - do not include NPM clauses in their BITs. 12 2
This presents a significant problem for many developing states. Capi-
tal-exporting states, and some large capital-importing states like India
against an otherwise well-founded claim for the breach of an international
obligation.").
117 The situation with regard to the Draft Articles is somewhat complicated by
Article 27, which indicates that wrongful conduct may be excused yet compensa-
tion is still due. See Draft Articles, supra note 36, at Art. 27(b).
118 See CMS Gas Award, supra note 37, at IT 353-393; Sempra Energy Award,
supra note 37, at 375; Enron Award, supra note 25, at 1 333.
119 See LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 12, at 1 258-261.
120 Draft Articles, supra note 36, Commentary, Chapter 5, at 7; see also id. at
Art. 55 (lex specialis).
121 See Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 2, at IT 128-136; CMS Gas Annul-
ment Decision, supra note 37, at 129-134; Sempra Energy Annulment Decision,
supra note 37, at I 109-118.
122 See, e.g., bilateral investment treaties signed by the Netherlands, United King-
dom, France, and Italy, available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page
1007.aspx.
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and China, negotiate BITs based on a model draft written internally.
By operating off their own model BIT, these states gain the advantage
of a uniform set of obligations resting within their own control. By
contrast, smaller developing states generally sign the modified ver-
sions of another state's model BIT.'12
With specific regard to the necessity defense, the consequence
of signing up for different treaty obligations remains unclear. Devel-
oping states are exposed to obligations that are significantly different
(NPM versus customary necessity) when dealing with investors of dif-
ferent nationalities. Argentina, for example, may be excused from lia-
bility to an investor from the United States but remain liable to a
British investor.124 In fact, this appears to have occurred already. Of
the claims decided under the US-Argentina BIT, the NPM clause is
the principal reason that Argentina escaped the lion's share of liabil-
ity.1 2 5 All other decided claims - which involved similar factual alle-
gations but fell under British, French, and Spanish BITs - reached the
opposite conclusion because they relied upon Article 25.126 Further-
more, due to the MFN clause, claimants may argue that developing
states cannot claim any protection under an NPM clause because they
have already guaranteed greater protection for similar investments to
nationals from other countries. 12 7
3.4.3 - Economic Necessity Under Art. 25
Where a state's economic necessity defense depends solely
upon Article 25, its chances of success are poor. In any arbitration
where Argentina has relied upon the Draft Articles' definition of neces-
sity, it has lost.128 The most significant barrier seems to be the man-
123 See Olivia Chung, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its
Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 953, 957-959
(2007).
124 Compare, e.g., US-Argentina BIT, supra note 26 (including an NPM clause),
with Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the
promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 11, 1990 [hereinafter UK-Argen-
tina BIT] (excluding an NPM clause), available at http://www.unctadxi.org/tem-
plates/DocSearch 779.aspx.
125 See Chart 1: Group 1, infra Appendix.
126 See Chart 1: Group 2, infra Appendix.
127 A BIT that lacks an NPM clause provides greater protection for investors,
which may have MFN implications. This argument is theoretical, but not without
support. See, e.g., CMS Gas Award, supra note 37, at 343; Pope & Talbot Inc. v.
Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, at 1 117 April 10, 2001 (UNCITRAL
Arbitration), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AwardMerits200l 04
10_Pope_001.pdf.
128 See Chart 1, Group 2, infra Appendix.
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ner in which the articles are written. The Draft Articles are a
codification of the "basic rules of international law concerning the re-
sponsibility of States . . ."1 2 9 They apply to the "whole field of interna-
tional obligations of states."1 3 0 Thus, they are "general in nature" and
expressed "at a high level of abstraction." 1 3  Furthermore, the articles
are largely the result of historical precedent rather than purposeful
thought.
With regard to Article 25, prior cases have primarily consid-
ered the obligations of states to other states.13 2 Investment treaty ar-
bitration is never considered, nor are the complexities related to
monetary policy. The consequence for Argentina is that it must force a
square peg into a round hole. Several international tribunals have
recognized the existence of the necessity defense in principle,1 3 3 al-
though no state has ever succeeded on the merits. 13 4 Necessity will
only exist in "those exceptional cases where the only way a State can
safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave and imminent
peril is, for the time being, not to perform some other international
obligation of lesser weight or urgency."1 3 5
There are four elements required for a successful claim of ne-
cessity: (1) the minimum threshold, (2) the comparative threshold, (3)
non-preclusion, and (4) non-contribution. Failure to satisfy any one re-
quirement results in a failure to assert the claim. First, per the mini-
mum threshold requirement, the state's wrongful action must have
been "the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril."1 3 6 This requires the state to
prove the existence of an "essential interest," a "grave and imminent
peril," and the lack of more lawful alternatives. Second, per the com-
129 Draft Articles, General Commentary, supra note 36, at 1.
130 Id. at ff 5.
131 Daniel Bodansky & John R. Crook, Symposium: The ILC's State Responsibility
Articles: Introduction and Overview, 96 AMv. J. INT'L L. 773, 780 (2002).
132 See Draft Articles, General Commentary, supra note 36, at IT 3-14.
133 See, Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, 1997
I.C.J. 7, I 51-52 (rejecting the claim of necessity because Hungary contributed to
the crisis) [hereinafter Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project]; Affaire de l'indemnite russe
(Russian Indemnity) (Russia, Turkey), 11 R.I.A.A. 421, 443 (1912) (rejecting the
claim of necessity - or force majeure - because the Ottoman Empire could have
paid without threatening its state).
134 See Draft Articles, General Commentary, supra note 36, at 3; see also LG&E
Decision on Liability, supra note 21 ("[t]he Tribunal noted that the state of neces-
sity defense under international law (Article 25 of the International Law Commis-
sion's Draft Articles on State Responsibility) also supported the Tribunal's
conclusion.").
135 Draft Articles, General Commentary, supra note 36, at 11 1 (emphasis added).
136 Id. at Art. 25(1)(a).
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parative threshold requirement, the states' wrongful action cannot
have "seriously impaired an essential interest" of another state or the
international community. "[Tihe interest relied on must outweigh all
other considerations . . ."3 Third, per the non-preclusion require-
ment, the international obligation cannot preclude necessity as a de-
fense. Fourth, per the non-contribution requirement, the state cannot
claim necessity if it has "contributed to the situation of necessity." Ac-
cording to the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") contribution may
be "by act or omission."' The result is that a state must cumulatively
establish six difficult elements to successfully claim necessity.
= Minimum Threshold
Comparative Threshold
Essential
Interest
Grave and
Imminent Peril
Lack of
More Lawful
Alternatives
Non-Preclusion
+ Non-Contribution
Cumulatively Satisfied
With regard to the claims against Argentina, three distinct po-
sitions have formed along the spectrum of necessity. For ease of analy-
sis, they are referred to here as the Restrictive position, the Moderate
position, and the Liberal position. 39
13 Id. at Art. 25(1)(b); Draft Articles, General Commentary, supra note 36, at ff
17.
138 Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 133, at 57.
139 Several opinions - the Continental Casualty Award, the CMS Gas Annulment
Decision and the Sempra Energy Annulment Decision - do not fall into any of
these positions due to the fact that they do not address the question of necessity
Necessity
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The Restrictive position, adopted by the CMS Gas, Sernpra En-
ergy, Enron, and BG Group awards, 4 0 would apply the necessity test
in a manner so strict as to be effectively impossible. According to these
tribunals, Argentina could not meet a single element of the necessity
test under Article 25 because (1) there can be no "essential interest"
where the existence of the state is not threatened;'' (2) there are "al-
ways many approaches" that a state may employ to combat economic
crises;' 42 (3) Argentina clearly contributed to the state of necessity; 4 a
(4) Argentina's actions impacted the essential interests of private in-
vestors, which the tribunals equated to an interest of the state.144 An-
other award, BG Group, doubted whether the Draft Articles could even
be invoked in a dispute against a private investor.14 5
These decisions are erroneous as to both fact and law. The his-
torical record indicates that the existence of the Argentine state was
under threat. Moreover, an "essential interest" need not be so severe
as to threaten the existence of the state. The Draft Articles cite multi-
ple incidents in which states have claimed necessity to protect either
an important industry or the local environment.' 46 The ICJ similarly
held environmental protection as an essential interest of the state.14 7
Why a state's economic stability is unclear. As to the statement in the
BG Group Award that necessity may be inapplicable altogether, the
tribunal cites no authority and no other tribunal takes such a strict
position. For these and other reasons, the Restrictive position has
been significantly criticized and even annulled by three separate IC-
SID annulment committees.148
The InterAgua and Vivendi/AWG Group decisions adopted the
Moderate position. These opinions recognized that domestic stability
(in these cases the continuous operation of water utilities) amidst an
under Article 25 without simultaneously referencing the NPM clause. Several
tribunals have confused these two standards. See Part 3.4.1, supra. Also, the Na-
tional Grid Award cannot be categorized because it relies solely upon the non-
contribution element to reject the necessity defense. National Grid Award, supra
note 32, at 257-262.
140 CMS Gas Award, supra note 37, at 315-331 Sempra Energy Award, supra
note 37, at 344-355; Enron Award, supra note 37, at T 303-313 BG Group
Award, supra note 37, at 407-412.
141 Enron Award, supra note 37, at T 305.
142 Id. at 1 308 (emphasis added).
"m Id. at 311-312.
144 Id. at 341-342.
145 BG Group Award, supra note 37, at 408-409.
m See generally Draft Articles, General Commentary, supra note 36, at 9 5-14.
147 See Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 133, at 53.
148 See generally CMS Award, supra note 37; Sempra Energy Award, supra note
37; Enron Award, supra note 37.
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economic crisis constituted an "essential interest.""' The state's ac-
tions, which profoundly affected investors, did not affect an essential
interest of other states.""o Furthermore, BITs do not preclude the ne-
cessity defense. Despite this, the Moderate position rejects two as-
pects of Argentina's defense. First, regarding the minimum threshold,
the tribunals suggest that Argentina's measures were not the "only
way" for it to deal with the crisis.'"' That said, Argentina's refusal to
negotiate in good faith with the water utilities may have been particu-
larly extreme in these cases.' Second, with regard to the non-contri-
bution requirement, the tribunals recognized that a combination of
endogenous and exogenous factors created the crisis. Consequently,
certain endogenous factors - "excessive public spending, inefficient tax
collection, delays in responding to the early signs of the crisis, insuffi-
cient efforts at developing an export market, and internal political dis-
sension and problems inhibiting effective policy making" - were
attributed to Argentina.1 s' The IMF's post-mortem report cor-
roborates these conclusions.1 54 Thus, the Moderate position also re-
jects Argentina's necessity defense, albeit on narrower grounds than
the Restrictive position.
The LG&E Decision on Liability and the Enron Annulment De-
cision adopted the Liberal position. According to the LG&E decision,
economic stability was an "essential interest."5 5 An "across the board
response" was the "only way" to counteract the crisis. Additionally,
there was "no serious evidence" that Argentina contributed to the cri-
sis. 156 However, even the LG&E decision does not fully embrace Arti-
cle 25. According to the tribunal, its decision depended upon the
presence of an NPM clause in the US-Argentina BIT.1 5 1
The other case adopting the Liberal position - the Enron An-
nulment Decision - represents a broadside attack on the Restrictive
interpretation of customary necessity. With regard to the minimum
threshold, the committee noted that the phrase "only way" is "capable
of more than one possible interpretation." A literal interpretation
would preclude the possibility of finding economic necessity because
149 See InerAgua Decision on Liability, supra note 1, at 238.
150 See id. at 1 239.
151 See id. at 1 238.
152 See Id. at 1 215. See also AWG Group/ Vivendi, supra note 1, at 260 ("Argen-
tina could have attempted to apply more flexible means to assure the continuation
of the water and sewage services ... and at the same time respected its obligations
15s Id. at 11 241-242.
154 See IMF INDEPENDENT EVA LUALTION REPORT, supra note 22, at 64.
155 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 12, at 1 251.
156 Id. at 246-257.
157 LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 12, at 258.
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there are always multiple possibilities (indeed, this is the principal er-
ror of the Restrictive Position). Alternatively, if a tribunal defined
"only way" as the least offensive way"' while recognizing that a mea-
sure must have a high likelihood of success before it can constitute an
"option" at all,1"' then the possibility of finding that a measure consti-
tuted the "only way" became very real.
The committee also asked whether the determination should
be made with "the benefit of . .. hindsight" or if the state should be
given a "margin of appreciation.""6 o With regard to the non-contribu-
tion requirement, the committee wondered whether contribution must
be deliberate, reckless, or simply negligent.1 6 1 Finally, the committee
criticized the tribunal for relying solely upon the report of an economic
expert to answer both the minimum threshold requirement and the
non-contribution requirement.
While an economist might regard a State's economic poli-
cies as misguided, and might conclude that such policies
led to or amplified the effects of an economic crisis, that
would not of itself necessarily mean that as a matter of
law, the State had 'contributed to the situation of neces-
sity' so as to preclude reliance on the principle of neces-
sity under customary international law.16 2
The Enron Annulment Decision, which represents the most re-
cent critique of necessity analysis to date, brings to the fore many of
the problems involved in applying the Draft Articles to investment
treaty disputes. The opinion clearly illustrates how the Draft Articles
- which are defined in rather abstract terms - do not directly address
the complex issues arising under the unique fact patterns of invest-
ment disputes."'s Annulment decisions are not like an appeal, so the
Enron committee did not reach conclusions of law; it merely posed
questions. The underlying message of the decision, however, is that
the Draft Articles are malleable. They bend to fit the needs of individ-
ual disputes.
Taken as a whole, these opinions are widely divergent. Some
cases would freely grant Argentina's defense while others question
whether the defense even exists. Divergent interpretations of identi-
cal facts are problematic because any conflict urges states to follow the
most restrictive interpretation in order to avoid future liability. Con-
sequently, states wishing to avoid liability must assume that the ne-
158 Enron Annulment Decision, supra note 2, at TT 369-370.
159 Id. at T 371.
160 Id. at 372.
161 Id. at 389.
162 Id. at 393.
163 See Bodansky & Crook, supra note 131, at 790.
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cessity defense is completely non-operative. This is particularly so
because the trend of jurisprudence runs against Argentina.
PART IV: IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 - Implications of the Dominant Jurisprudence
The application of BIT liability to financial crises entails sev-
eral negative consequences. First, it creates a profound tension be-
tween the powerful need for reform and the prospect of significant
liability. The more severe the crisis, the more likely that reform is
necessary. Yet, the more profound the reform, the more likely that
investors will initiate investment treaty claims. Second, it incen-
tivizes investors to make poor investing choices and thereby creates
moral hazard in the market place. Third, it hobbles the ability of
states to recover.
4.1.1 - Tension Between Necessary Reform and Potential Liability
As described in Part II, supra, economic crises are a normal
part of the economic cycle. They are difficult to predict, profoundly
destabilizing, almost always require government intervention, and
have long-term consequences. Furthermore, crisis frequently leads to
sovereign default. Due to a lack of robust institutions and a perceived
weakness by international markets, developing states are more sus-
ceptible to both economic crisis and default. All states remain subject
to the same cycle, even if the period between crises may be longer for
some states. 164
Under the strict interpretation of investment treaty protec-
tions, these practical considerations fall by the wayside. The modern
interpretation of BIT standards emphasizes the investor's "legitimate"
expectations over the needs of the state to regulate. The fair and equi-
table treatment standard in particular forces the state to maintain a
stable legal environment. The necessity defense under customary in-
ternational law is no avenue for defense. Even where the state deter-
mines in good faith that the best remedy for its citizens and the
economy over the long-term may be to enact reform, liability is due."' 5
Even where the state cannot pay, liability is due. Even in situations
where a dramatic alteration in policy is forced upon the state, liability
will be due because there are always endogenous factors that cause
164 See supra Part II.
165 See CMS Gas Award, supra note 37, at [ 280 ("The tribunal believes this is an
objective requirement unrelated to whether the Respondent has had any deliber-
ate intention or bad faith. . .").
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economic crises. Viewed with the advantage of hindsight, the flaws in
economic policy are always clear to economists and tribunals.
Consequently, the only way for a state to avoid liability is by imple-
menting perfect economic policy at the outset. Tribunals do not admit
this expressly, but such is the effect of jurisprudence. According to
current jurisprudence, the investor can develop a "reasonable" expec-
tation based upon an unsustainable policy because reasonableness
does not depend upon whether government guarantees are even prac-
tical.1 6 6 The state's reasons for enacting legal reform are similarly ir-
relevant.'6 7 Even where the need for reform is extreme, failure to
enact initially perfect policy leads tribunals to conclude that the state
has "contributed" to the crisis. 16 After all, these tribunals imply, the
need for reform is serious only because the proper policy was not im-
plemented in the first place. On that basis, tribunals consistently re-
ject the necessity defense. 169
Accordingly, this jurisprudence creates tension between the
state's regulatory obligations and its liability under investment trea-
ties. Reform may be necessary, but investment treaty protections act
as disincentives. Argentina's predicament reveals this tension may be
extreme. Many economists concluded that Argentina had to break the
Convertibility regime and devalue its currency, pesification all debts
in dollars, and default on its massive foreign debts. In fact, the IMF
determined that Argentina waited too long to break Convertibility."'o
Nevertheless, angered foreign investors now insist they are due bil-
lions of dollars in lost assets and profit, a great deal more than Argen-
tina can pay. Bondholders who happily purchased high yield
Argentine bonds (directly related to greater country risk) now insist
they have a guaranteed right to the repayment of billions of dollars in
defaulted debt.17 1 Whatever the merits of an economic policy frozen in
time may be during a period of relative stability, an economic crisis
brings the shortcomings of this philosophy into sharp relief. This is
how, as Professor Pedro Nikken wrote, BIT jurisprudence obligates
countries "beyond what the canons of good governance would
require."172
166 See supra Part 3.1.2.
167 See Sempra Energy Award, supra note 37, at 304.
168 See, e.g., National Grid Award, supra note 43, at T 258.
169 See e.g., id. at T 260.
170 IMF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 22, at 64 (noting that Con-
vertibility, while successful in ending hyperinflation, had significant drawbacks in
the medium term).
171 See generally Becarra Order, supra note 45.
172 VicendilAWG Group Decision on Liability (Separate Opinion of Prof. Pedro
Nikken), supra note 1, at 20, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Suez
VivendiAWGSeparateOpnion.pdf (emphasis added).
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4.1.2 - Moral Hazard
Moral hazard - defined by Krugman as "[t~he possibility that
you will take less care to prevent an accident if you are insured against
it"1 7 3 - may be embedded within the current system of BIT protec-
tions. Although determining the precise effects of moral hazard is dif-
ficult, the concern is serious enough to warrant further study.1 7 4 By
granting investors an enforceable legal right without obligating them
to complete their due diligence, the BIT system encourages investors
to make bad investments in foreign markets. Obviously, BITs were
not designed to accomplish this purpose. Nonetheless, it may have
happened to Argentina. By emphasizing the fact that Argentina pro-
moted its investor-friendly climate, tribunals hold Argentina liable to
the letter of every guarantee. Investors, by contrast, are entirely ex-
cused for participating in an asset bubble driven by irrational
euphoria.
4.1.3 - Long-Term Consequences
Reinhart and Rogoff demonstrate that financial crises have
long-term impacts on the economy. Regardless of the cause or nature
of the crisis, the state requires several years before returning to pre-
crisis levels of economic stability and output.1 7 5 However, if a state is
subjected to a wave of arbitration claims - as Argentina has been - it
may prolong the state's period of insolvency. As of January 2010,
holdout bondholders have successfully frozen over US$2 billion of Ar-
gentina's assets in the United States through domestic litigation.1 7 1
Extending this power to international tribunals under the Washington
and New York Conventions would allow for the full-scale internation-
alization of bondholder claims. Bondholders would hold guaranteed
rights that are internationally enforceable, which discourages them
from reaching a negotiated solution. 77 Even with modern sovereign
bonds that include CACs, 75% of bondholders must agree before the
173 See KRuGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 43, at 591; see also DESAI, supra note
13, at 242 ("Moral hazard is invoked in situations involving human responses that
tend to be reckless if their consequences are guaranteed not to be penalized.").
174 See Jeffrey A. Frankel & Nouriel Roubini, The Role of Industrial Country Poli-
cies in Emerging Market Crises, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING
MARKET ECONOMIES, 198-200 (Martin Feldstein ed. 2003) ("Both debtor moral haz-
ard and creditor moral hazard deriving from expectations of bailout via official
support are important enough to be a concern for the design of an efficient interna-
tional financial system.").
175 See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 13, at 236.
176 See J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41029, ARGENTINA'S DEFAULTED
SOVEREIGN DEBT: DEALING WITH THE 'HOLDOUTS' 5-7 (2010).177 See ICSID Convention, supra note 9, at Art. 53-54 (providing that awards are
binding, without rights of appeal, and enforceable in all member states).
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settlement becomes mandatory.77 If one in four bondholders prefers
investment arbitration to a negotiated settlement, then the negotia-
tion will fail. The result is that power shifts significantly from the
state to bondholders in settlement negotiations.1 7 9
These drawbacks - discouraging necessary reform, encourag-
ing poor investment choices, and prolonging the period of default -
speak to the fact that investment arbitration simply was not designed
to resolve sovereign bankruptcy. Applying these standards without re-
gard to the implications does real damage to the citizens who must
bear the burden of a drawn out process of BIT arbitration involving
massive claims.
4.2 - Recommendations
Depending upon how one interprets the problem, there are a
number of different potential resolutions to the sovereign debtor's
trap. Some commentators see these claims as part of a larger struc-
tural problem with the entire system. They argue for the establish-
ment of a permanent appellate body that can address a range of issues
affecting the legitimacy of the BIT system.' 8 0 The criticism is valid
enough to convince the United States to amend its own model BIT in
anticipation of such a system.' 8  With regard to the economic neces-
sity defense, a permanent appellate body of experts appointed by
states may have a greater sensitivity to the complex issues involved in
an economic crisis. Furthermore, due to the myriad of contradictory
opinions, there is probably no way to reconcile them without a struc-
tural reform of the entire system. That said, an appellate court is not
a panacea. Several of the arbitrators who found Argentina's behavior
completely inexcusable are themselves experts in international law
with significant experience in government.
Other commentators focus on general problems with BIT inter-
pretation - specifically the tribunal's failure to sufficiently consider
the state's regulatory responsibilities. These commentators recom-
17 See Andrew Haldane et al., Optimal Collective Action Clause Thresholds, 7
(Bank of England, Working Paper No. 249, 2004).
179 Waibel, supra note 105, at 758 ("Because of the higher expected recovery (in
dollars, taking into account the likelihood of repayment), bondholders will be more
inclined to hold out and, bundling their claims whenever possible, to seek payment
through arbitration.").
1so See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion: Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1521 (2005); Jan Laird & Rebecca Askew, Finality Versus Consistency: Does
Investor-State Arbitration Need An Appellate System?, 7 J. A'. PRAC. & PROCESS
285 (2005).
181 See, e.g., U.S. Model BIT (2004), Art. 28(10), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/U.S.%20model%20BIT.pdf.
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mend that tribunals consider the emerging concept of international
regulatory law, which would weigh both the investor's expectations in
conjunction with other values that are particularly important to a well
functioning state.IM2 This proposal also has merit. Many of the tribu-
nals who have found Argentina liable display an almost dogmatic ad-
herence to the notion of pacta sunt servanda. They fail to appreciate
that unforeseeable consequences often arise, which governments must
address regardless of previously held positions.
These proposals are worthwhile. Indeed, policymakers proba-
bly should have considered them before the world ratified 2,000-plus
bilateral treaties, a web of competing obligations from which it may be
impossible to extricate. However, creating an international appellate
body remains unlikely in the near term. Furthermore, recommending
that arbitrators fundamentally alter their interpretive approach may
not be well received by the loose association of arbitrators who have
labored to build a body of precedent upon which they now rely. In-
stead, the best reform may be less revolutionary.
The principal issue with regard to the claims against Argen-
tina is that they do not comport with economic realities, and since
macroeconomic fundamentals are not about to change, the current le-
gal reasoning should be altered. Otherwise, BITs will not serve the
purpose of their existence, which is to encourage economic growth.18 3
Rather than following the current strict interpretations of ne-
cessity, one can reasonably argue that many prior tribunals have
reached an absurd conclusion based upon an excessively literal inter-
pretation of international law. Assuming arguendo that (a) invest-
ment treaties protect investor expectations without limitation and (b)
a claim of economic necessity is impossible to establish because states
always contribute to their own economic demise, the fact remains that
the state is insolvent. Although BITs may be designed to apply when
property guarantees are unpopular, they are not designed to act as a
form of insolvency law for sovereign states. If the drafters of these
agreements had intended as much, then model BITs would include ex-
press provisions regarding the consolidation of claims, attachable ver-
sus protected property, restructuring of debt, et cetera. Furthermore,
given the nature of the global economy, any insolvency agreement
would have to be multilateral in order to function. Thus, by applying
the terms of the treaty literally, tribunals have failed to adhere to the
182 See generally Kingsbury & Schill, supra note 83; Gus Van Harten, Investment
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT. L.
121 (2006).
183 See US-Argentina BIT, supra note 26, at Preamble (encouraging the "maxi-
mum effective use of economic resources" and "desiring to "increase prosperity in
both states.").
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treaty's implied limitations. This constitutes a manifest excess of
power and none of these decisions should be followed.
The more difficult question, though, is determining what the
appropriate response should be. It is one thing to say that prior tribu-
nals are wrong, quite another to definitively state what is right. Fur-
thermore, given the fact that no one seriously considered this issue
during the process of treaty negotiation, it must be conceded that there
is no "right answer." The best solution must integrate two competing
values. On the one hand, BITs are applicable even in difficult circum-
stances. On the other hand, BITs do not apply to financial crises
where the notion of individual ad hoc claims does not comport with the
reality of multiple claimants battling over the assets of an insolvent
state whose assets are best preserved for its suffering population.
It is submitted that the best resolution to this problem is to
follow ICJ's analysis in the Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project.1 8 4 This
case involved a treaty between Hungary and Slovakia for the long-
term joint development of a hydroelectric facility along the Danube
River. After several years, it became increasingly clear that the pro-
ject was environmentally unsustainable under the treaty's original
plan. Due to these concerns, Hungary suspended the treaty.1 a5 Ac-
cordingly, the ICJ faced a similar problem of competing values. A
valid treaty existed and both parties had already expended enormous
effort and money; but the potential detriments of enforcing the literal
terms of the treaty were real.
The ICJ determined that the "good faith" element of Article 31
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") required
consideration of new circumstances. 1 8  Consequently, while the ICJ
rejected Hungary's assertion of necessity on the basis that it had con-
tributed to the problem,1 17 it nevertheless recognized that changed cir-
cumstances must always be considered.
Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and
such new standards given proper weight, not only when
States contemplate new activities but also when continu-
ing with activities begun in the past. This need to recon-
cile economic development with protection of the
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustain-
able development.'
184 See Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 133.
185 Id. at TT 32-33.
186 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
187 Gabeikovo-Nagyrnaros Project, supra note 133, at 50-58.
188 Id. at T 140.
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Replace the word "environment" with "economy" and the
Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project is directly on point." The ICJ's ruling
directs that "it is the purpose of the Treaty, and the intentions of the
parties in concluding it, which should prevail over its literal applica-
tion."19 o Thus, the ICJ ordered the parties to renegotiate in good
faith. 191
Several of the Argentine tribunals cited Gabbikovo-Nagymaros
Project approvingly in order to demonstrate that their strict interpre-
tation of the necessity defense was accurate.' 9 2 However, they failed
to address what the case actually stands for - the notion that "good
faith" under the VCLT requires the parties to address new problems
through renegotiation. Incidentally, the Unidroit Principles on Inter-
national Commercial Contracts ("PICC") provide the same remedy for
hardship, Art. 6.2.1-6.2.3.193 Where an event "fundamentally alters
the equilibrium of the contract ", a disadvantaged party is entitled to
request renegotiation in good faith and even seek the assistance of a
court in the process.19 4 Furthermore, as mentioned above, renegoti-
ation under CACs is the current chosen remedy for sovereign bond
defaults.1 9 5
Indeed, exceptions to liability exist throughout international
law. The ICJ has noted, for example, that "[e]very system of law must
provide . . . for interferences with the normal exercise of rights during
public emergencies and the like."196 Article XX of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade permits states to enact any law that it
deems necessary to accomplish a variety of policy goals.1 97 Article 79
of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods exempts an otherwise liable party where failure of per-
189 See ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 182 (2008) ("[S] sustainable development is referred to
in a number of international instruments, mostly in the field of international envi-
ronmental law and international economic law.").
190 Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 133, at 142.
191 Id. at 140 ("For the purposes of the present case, this means that the Parties
together should look afresh at the effects on the environment of the operation of
the Gabeikovo power plant.").
192 See, e.g., Enron Award, supra note 25, at 313.
193 See Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, Art.
6.2.1-6.2.3 (Hardship) [hereinafter PICC], available at http://www.unidroit.org/en-
glish/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf.
194 id.
195 See Haldane, supra note 179.
196 Elettronica Sicula S.P.A.(ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15, 74.
197 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
194.
3812011}
382 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:3
formance is due to an impediment beyond the party's control.' 98 These
rules of exception-found in public international law, international
contract law, and international economic law-address the fundamen-
tal unpredictability of economic circumstances.
Admittedly, the notion of forced renegotiation is not without
flaws. Most significantly, BITs do not provide for a renegotiation pro-
cess. A tribunal, thus, runs the risk of annulment for issuing an order
to renegotiate. But then again, the current strain of jurisprudence has
already been significantly criticized and annulled twice.' 9 9 Further-
more, BITs do not limit an arbitral tribunal's ability to consider
outside sources of international law. Most BITs call for tribunals to
decide according to the "applicable principals of international law."2)
These provisions permit tribunals to consider the necessity defense
under Article 25 of the Draft Articles.2 01 They also permit tribunals to
consider other aspects of international law, such as the obligation to
interpret treaties in "good faith" and the resolution adopted in the
Gabeikoo-Nagymaros Project.
CONCLUSION
Jurisprudence with regard to the necessity defense is unsatis-
factory for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the dominant posi-
tion effectively precludes a state from successfully claiming economic
necessity ab initio. This is concerning because all countries are likely
to experience an economic crisis over time. By ratifying BITs with sig-
nificantly different provisions, they are obligated to comply with diver-
gent treaty obligations. Furthermore, developing countries are at
greater risk of economic crisis and default. Thus, their exposure to
massive liability is very real.
Accordingly, arbitral tribunals need to consider the greater im-
plications of their awards in order to reach a just solution. It is sub-
mitted that tribunals should force the parties to renegotiate rather
than apply full liability upon the state. Compulsory renegotiation has
the advantage of preserving the state's treaty obligations without over-
estimating the investor's "legitimate" expectations amidst a crisis.
There are likely to be other possible solutions. Given the lack of a
198 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Art. 79, April 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
199 See William W. Burke-White, The Argentine Financial Crisis: State Liability
Under BITs and the Legitimacy of the ICSID System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L
HEALTH L & POL'Y, 199, 201 (2008) ("The resulting jurisprudence of the ICSID
Tribunals in four cases against Argentina decided by early 2008 is deeply problem-
atic, due in part to poor legal reasoning and questionable treaty interpretation ").
200) See, e.g., UK-Argentina BIT, supra note 124, at Art. 8(4).
201 See LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 21, at T 85.
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clear answer under the law, no order of priority can be established. It
is clear, however, that failure to consider these greater implications
would constitute error by undermining the intentions of the states that
ratify investment treaties.
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